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Abstract
Extending a brand beyond its original product category is a major strategy for long-term
profitability. A brand owner can internalize the development of the extension product, or license
the brand to an external partner in order to exploit the licensee’s better capabilities and higher
efficiency on the targeted market. Brand extension is characterized by the presence of the so-
called reciprocal effect, whereby the effort exerted to develop and market the extension has a
feedback effect – either positive or negative – on the value of the parent brand. Under licensing,
this effect is an externality from the standpoint of the brand owner. The licensing relationship is
characterized by double-sided moral hazard, requiring an incentivizing contract; the reciprocal
effect adds a further element that should be governed by the contract. Indeed, a positive effect
can boost the attractiveness of licensing relative to internal development, whereas a negative one
can have the opposite effect. Drawing from extant literature, we build a game-theoretical model
and show how reciprocal effect, (dis)similarity between the extension product and the parent
brand, and (in)efficiency of the brand owner relative to the licensee in developing the extension
shape the optimal licensing contract and affect the choice between internal development and
licensing.
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Non-technical summary
Extending a brand beyond its original product category is a major strategy for long-
term profitability: By leveraging on the brand name, the brand owner can launch
new products, enter new markets, and capture new opportunities. Brand extension
enables lower product introduction costs, reduces the perceived risks for consumers,
and helps to solidify the presence in market of the new product. Accordingly, recent
decades have seen the launch of myriad brand extensions in an effort to drive growth;
indeed, approximately 90% of new products are extensions of existing brand names.
A brand owner develop internally the extension product at the cost of acquiring the
necessary know-how, or license the brand to an external partner in order to exploit the
licensee’s better capabilities and higher efficiency on the targeted market, at the cost
of –partially– forfeiting control over the extension process. Brand extension is charac-
terized by the presence of the so-called reciprocal effect, whereby the effort exerted to
develop and market the extension has a feedback effect – either positive or negative
– on the value of the parent brand. The more “similar” is the extension product to
the “characterizing image” of the parent brand, the stronger is the reciprocal effect.
Under licensing, because of the outsourcing of the extension process, the reciprocal
effect is an externality from the standpoint of the brand owner. In addition, the licens-
ing relationship is characterized by double-sided moral hazard, because neither party
can directly control the partner’s effort in developing and promoting the brand and/or
the extension product. The licensing contract, therefore, has to be designed both to
give the parties the right incentives to nurture the brand and develop the extension,
and to account for the reciprocal effect. Indeed, a positive effect can boost the at-
tractiveness of licensing relative to internal development, whereas a negative one can
have the opposite effect. Drawing from extant literature, we build a game-theoretical
model and show how the size and sign of the reciprocal effect, the (dis)similarity be-
tween the extension product and the parent brand, and the (in)efficiency of the brand
owner relative to the licensee in developing the extension shape the optimal licensing
contract and affect the choice between internal development and licensing.
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1 Introduction
Extending a brand beyond its original product category represents a major strategy for companies
seeking long-term profitability. In fact, by leveraging the brand equity associated with their brand
names, companies can launch new products, enter new markets, and capture new opportunities.
Brand extension enables lower product introduction costs, reduces the perceived risks for consumers,
and helps to solidify the new product’s market presence. Accordingly, recent decades have seen
the launch of myriad brand extensions in an effort to drive growth. Indeed, approximately 90% of
new products are extensions of existing brand names (Hariharan et al., 2014, Keller et al., 2008).
Yet, this strategy can have a two-way effect: The parent brand might empower the new extension
product via a direct effect, but the extension product might also enhance or diminish the equity
of the parent brand.1 The management literature refers to the former case as positive reciprocal
effect or brand enhancement, and to the latter as negative reciprocal effect or brand dilution (e.g.,
Gürhan-Canli and Maheswaran, 1998, Keller and Aaker, 1992).
For brand owners, extending their branded product portfolio requires the ownership of resources
and competences that the company may not have or that may be too expensive to acquire or develop
internally. In such cases, firms can manage the extension in two ways: First, they can invest
resources to internally acquire or develop the extension, which implies an increase in the company’s
level of vertical integration. The second is to identify and select a venture partner and perform
the extension through brand licensing (Colucci et al., 2008).2 Brand licensing entails the renting
or leasing of the company’s brand name to an external actor (e.g., LIMA, 2018, Robinson et al.,
2015). This approach has proliferated over the last 30 years, allowing firms to introduce a brand
to new product categories without making major investments in manufacturing or distribution
activities. Under a licensing agreement, a company (the licensor) gives an industrial or retail
partner (the licensee) the rights to use its brand name in return for a negotiated payment (a
fee or royalties, typically a percentage of wholesale revenues). This agreement thus creates an
agency relationship where both parties have different goals: The former aims to increase brand
awareness, while the latter strives for commercial diffusion in order to increase its own profits
(Raugust, 2012). Granted, like with all licensing agreements (such as technological licensing), there
1The parent brand is an existing brand used to create a new product called the brand extension (Aaker and
Keller, 1990, John et al., 1998).
2“[. . . ] Porsche sunglasses, Coca-Cola clothes, and many other licensing ventures brought a new emphasis on
managing brands. As an example, Ocean Pacific (OP) Sunwear, which started as clothing manufacturer, ’quit making
its own products in 1980. The company felt it would function more efficiently and grow more quickly by concentrating
solely on selling its name’ (Day, 1985, p.1).” (Tauber, 1988, p. 26).
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is a risk of either party behaving opportunistically, especially in conditions of imperfect monitoring
(Choi, 2001, Jayachandran et al., 2013, Robinson et al., 2015), and thereby failing to maximize the
value of the relationship. On one hand, the licensor may deny support to the partner’s business
depending on, for example, the contract’s compensation structure (i.e., royalties, a percentage of
the licensee’s sales and/or a lump sum, a fixed negotiated amount), the strategic relevance of the
new product for the parent brand, or the possibility of replacing the licensee. Such behavior(s)
may damage the licensee’s profits and thereby diminish its investments in the product. On the
other hand, the licensee might exert a weak effort toward the extension or fail to comply with
the brand image guidelines, whether in terms of design, quality of materials used, or the use of
inappropriate channels. This would ultimately undermine the proper development of the extension
product. Furthermore, the behavior of the licensee may have specific effects in the framework of
brand licensing: For instance, transcending the boundaries of the licensed product’s market may
impact the licensor’s brand equity—and ultimately profits—in the other markets where it operates.
In other words, a reciprocal effect (positive or negative) may occur when the extension is managed
via licensing. Consequently, the success of brand licensing depends on the extent to which the
licensing contract aligns the goals of both parties (as in technological licensing or franchising), as
well as monitors and governs the reciprocal effect (which is specific to brand licensing).
Based on the above, this paper assumes two main objectives. First, we analyze the character-
istics of the optimal brand licensing contract by evaluating how the extension product’s reciprocal
effect (positive or negative) influences the parent brand value. Second, we assess the conditions
under which a brand owner should prefer a licensing agreement to in-house development, hereafter
referred to as the choice of make-or-license.
To delve into these issues, we draw from both the management and industrial organization
literatures in order to develop a strategic dynamic model where both the brand owner and the
(potential) licensee can carry out the extension project. The model is characterized by the following
features: First, any investment in creating and maintaining brand value is beneficial to the extension
product; similarly, any investment in the extension product has a feedback effect (either positive
or negative) on the brand value. Second, under licensing, both the brand owner/licensor and the
licensee face a moral hazard problem as they cannot observe each other’s efforts in, respectively,
maintaining the brand’s relevance and offering a suitable extension product. Finally, under in-
house development, the brand owner is assumed to be less cost-efficient than the potential licensee
in terms of executing the extension project.
The reciprocal, or feedback, effect is the distinguishing feature of our model, differentiating our
analysis from extant research on technological licensing and franchising. In particular, we assume
that licensing can entail either positive (brand enhancement) or negative (brand dilution) feedback
on the brand value, while the feedback from in-house production is solely positive. We assume
that the actual impact of the feedback effect is mediated by the dissimilarity between the extension
product and the parent brand (i.e., how they “unfit” together): the larger the dissimilarity, the
lesser the feedback, all else being equal. Research has tested this effect in the context of brand
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extension (e.g., Keller and Aaker, 1992), but our study extends this suggestion to the context
of business models used to carry out extensions (i.e., make-or-license). The second feature, the
double-sided moral hazard, has already been investigated in the context of technological licensing
(e.g., Choi, 2001), but is fairly new to the literature on brand licensing (Jayachandran et al., 2013).
The core idea here is that such agreements involve non-appropriable investments that arise from
a misalignment of incentives between the licensor and the licensee. Finally, in order to highlight
an interesting trade-off, we disregard the case whereby the licensee is less cost-efficient than the
licensor in executing the extension, which accords with the prevailing literature on technological
licensing.
We characterize (i) the optimal licensing contract based on a non-linear, two-part tariff (i.e., a
royalty rate and a fixed payment, following Choi (2001) and Raugust (2012)), and (ii) the brand
owner’s optimal choice in terms of either becoming a licensor or pursuing in-house production. We
focus our analysis on the magnitude and sign of the reciprocal effect, on the perceived dissimilarity
between the extension product and the parent brand (Yeung and Wyer Jr, 2005), and on the relative
cost inefficiency of the brand-owner vis-à-vis the licensee in carrying out the extension project.
We find that an optimal licensing agreement exists for both in the cases of brand enhancement
and brand dilution: When there is brand enhancement (dilution), a larger dissimilarity between
the extension product and the parent brand causes an increase (decrease) in the optimal royalty
rate. Furthermore, we show that the optimal royalty rate is larger (smaller) as the brand dilution
(enhancement) increases. This result suggests that the royalty rate not only informs the incentive
structure and extraction of (a part of) the licensee’s profit, as typically explored in the literature,
but also acts as a contractual tool for indirectly governing the feedback effect from the licensee’s
activity on the value of the parent brand.
As for the trade-off between licensing or in-house development, we argue that the choice crucially
depends on the dissimilarity and cost-inefficiency parameter conditions. Expectedly, a large and
negative reciprocal effect—combined with a low development cost for the brand owner—makes in-
house development the dominant choice; in contrast, a large and positive reciprocal effect—combined
with a high development cost for the brand owner—makes licensing the better option. It is worth
emphasizing that dissimilarity plays a crucial role in all the other parameter conditions. We show
that for a positive reciprocal effect, a “relatively efficient” brand owner licenses the extension when
the dissimilarity is low (to benefit from a large brand enhancement), but opts for in-house develop-
ment when the dissimilarity increases (to avoid entering an incentivizing licensing contract). The
opposite occurs when the brand owner is inefficient and the feedback effect is negative or slightly
positive. Finally, we show that dissimilarity can have a non-linear effect on the choice of the opti-
mal business model, so that in-house development is preferable for “small” and “large” dissimilarity
levels, but licensing is superior for “intermediate” ones.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant managerial
and economic literature. Section 3 develops a model of brand extension and analyzes the brand
owner’s optimal choice between brand licensing and in-house development. Section 4 discusses the
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results and their theoretical and empirical implications.
2 Related literature
Brand extension has been a central topic in the managerial literature since the 1990s (Aaker and
Keller, 1990, Broniarczyk and Alba, 1994) and remains a lively area of study (e.g., de Groote et al.,
2019, Hariharan et al., 2014, Miniard et al., 2018, Monga and John, 2010, Pina et al., 2013). This
literature has largely examined the advantages and disadvantages associated with brand extension:
The former include reducing the risks and costs of introductory marketing programs, as well as
consumers’ increased acceptance of the new product. The latter involve potential damage to the
brand’s existing products and the brand itself if the extension fails, which creates considerable risk
for brand equity dilution (Aaker and Keller, 1990, Keller and Sood, 2003, Loken and John, 1993).
Recent contributions have not only developed a comprehensive framework for the determinants
of brand extension success, but also highlighted the antecedents and consequences of consumer
attitude toward a brand extension (Czellar, 2003, Völckner and Sattler, 2006), as well as uncovered
the feedback effect of extensions on the parent brand (Michel and Donthu, 2014, Pina et al., 2013,
Salinas and Pérez, 2009).
The industrial organization literature, starting from the seminal work of Wernerfelt (1988) has
investigated how brand extensions—using the label “umbrella branding”—work to signal quality
to consumers. Because consumers cannot perfectly observe product quality, they base their ex-
pectations on the quality of the original branded product(s). Because of this quality signal, firms
must carefully design business strategies to take into account the benefits and costs of exploiting
such an opportunity (e.g., Cabral, 2000, Cabral, 2009, Hakenes and Peitz, 2008, Miklós-Thal, 2012,
Rasmusen, 2016 and the references therein).
These strands of literature have focused on the brand extension decision per se (i.e., branded
products vs. new brands) or on consumers’ evaluations of brand extensions. What remains nearly
untouched is the examination of how companies carry out such extensions, with the implicit as-
sumption being that in-house development is the preferable choice (see Colucci et al., 2008 for an
exception). Consequently, the extant literature has not considered the value in alternative business
models for executing brand extensions, nor their possible contractual characteristics. Nonetheless,
brand licensing is a widely used business tool that allows companies to extend a brand into new
categories and increase its exposure in consumers’ lives. Having achieved maturation and global
stature, licensing now encompasses myriad industries, including entertainment, fashion, sports,
publishing, music and art; in terms of revenue, the worldwide retail sales of licensed products
reached an estimated US$271.6 billion in 2017 (Loveday, 2018). The top licensing property type is
entertainment/character, with The Walt Disney Company being the world’s largest licensor, while
fashion/apparel leads all product categories (LIMA, 2018). In particular, there has been a contin-
uous increase in the use of corporate brand licensing especially for fashion labels in categories such
as apparel, beauty, accessories and eyewear (Raugust, 2012).
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While brand licensing has helped many established brands grow rapidly, promote a lifestyle on
the market, and offer a wide product range (e.g., Walt Disney, Hasbro, Christian Dior, or Armani),
it has also contributed to the failure and/or dilution of important brands.3 Pierre Cardin was once
the epitome of brand extension via licensing, managing 500 licensing agreements, including one
for toilet-seat covers; another example is Yves Saint Laurent, which managed 60 contracts in 2001
and then cut back to 15 the next year (Corbellini and Saviolo, 2014). Beyond the issue of product
over-saturation, brand dilution is typically caused when the licensor—for whom maintaining brand
image and value is paramount—loses control of the brand (Raugust, 2012). One illustrative example
comes from Calvin Klein: In 2000, the firm charged Warnaco Group, its licensee, with brand equity
dilution for breaching the jeanswear licensing and distribution contract—namely, by distributing
products through warehouse clubs that the brand owner considered unacceptable channels. The
same year, Warnaco filed countersuit, accusing Calvin Klein of ineffective brand advertising and
thus damaging its business (Fournier and Boer, 2002). Given situations like these, companies have
decided to limit licensing-related growth by taking back control (i.e., in-house development) over
some of their related businesses, with the aim of controlling the production cycle and the flow of
profits.
Today, licensing is especially important for “peripheral” businesses where production and dis-
tribution specificities hold, such as, for instance in the case of fashion companies, eyewear, watches,
fragrances and cosmetics, and accessories (Corbellini and Saviolo, 2014, Colucci et al., 2008).4 In
licensing agreements, the licensor contributes its reputation, brand image and creativity, while the
licensee offers its manufacturing and distribution know-how. Given this split, the licensor and li-
censee naturally have different goals and strategies. The licensor aims to nurture and strategically
orient the brand, searching for an exclusive image and product positioning that increases brand
awareness. The licensee’s goal is to exploit consumers’ brand awareness and push commercial dif-
fusion in order to increase revenues (Raugust, 2012). In this vein, the success of a brand licensing
program depends on the extent to which such an arrangement meets the goals of both parties
involved. The licensor may want to receive (possibly high) royalties while controlling the partner’s
use of the brand, whereas the licensee may want to maximize its investments in the extension
product and boost sales.
Despite its practical importance, brand licensing has received very little attention—both the-
oretical and empirical—from managerial research. For instance, scholars have shown how moral
hazard affects royalty rates (Jayachandran et al., 2013), the financial impact of brand licensing as
related to the brand “fit” (Robinson et al., 2015), and the conditions under which brand licens-
3The Walt Disney Company, Hasbro and Warner Bros. Consumer Products are among the top global licensors
(Global, 2016). In the fashion industry, the use of brand licensing is broad and established, dating back to 1950s
when Christian Dior, Chanel and Pierre Cardin started licensing their names (Saviolo and Giannelli, 2001).
4A notable exception is French luxury conglomerate Kering. In 2014, the firm terminated its 20-year licensing
partnership with Italian eyewear producer Safilo Group for the production of Gucci-branded eyewear, so as to develop
this product category in-house. In this way, Kering took control over the entire eyewear value chain (Fernie and Perry,
2019). Meanwhile, competing companies such as Tom Ford or Armani continue to rely on industrial partners to whom
they license their brands.
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ing is preferable to internal development (Colucci et al., 2008). These works have been partially
informed by research on brand extensions (e.g., Loken et al., 2010, Völckner and Sattler, 2006),
which overlaps considerably with brand licensing contexts; however, there are also critical differ-
ences (Robinson et al., 2015). Both brand licensing and brand extension involve leveraging an
established brand to produce and sell a new product, but licensing also entails leasing the brand to
a contracted business entity (i.e., via an inter-organizational arrangement). This means that the
brand owner sacrifices some control over the brand and risks becoming exposed to opportunistic
behavior and brand dilution.
Industrial Organization research, on another hand has thoroughly analyzed the economics of
technological licensing, particularly in the presence of innovative investments and moral hazard
(see e.g. Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine, 1995, Choi, 2001, Hernández-Murillo and Llobet, 2006,
Tauman and Zhao, 2018 and the references therein). The problem with the above contributions
is their exclusive focus on technological licensing and franchising, which lack the reciprocal effect
native to brand licensing.5
To the best of our knowledge, no attempt has been made, so far, to incorporate in a single
model the analysis of the decision whether to extend a brand internally or through brand licensing,
and the characterization of the optimal licensing contract, as we do in the present essay. Bridging
the management and industrial organization literatures on brand extension and brand licensing,
this study proposes a strategic dynamic model that can analyze the drivers behind pursuing or
avoiding brand licensing. In particular, we focus on two factors that have surfaced in prior research
on brand licensing, but remain under-searched.
The first is the presence of a feedback effect which is influenced by how well the extension product
“fits” the parent brand, that refers to the degree of similarity (or its opposite, dissimilarity) between
the parent brand and the extension. Similarity (or fit) has a dual relevance: It is one of the main
drivers of brand extension success because it determines how strongly consumers transfer brand
perceptions from the parent brand in its original application (i.e., the core product) to the brand
in its new application (the extension product) based on the perceived fit between the two (e.g.,
Aaker and Keller, 1990, Bottomley and Holden, 2001, Broniarczyk and Alba, 1994, Miniard et al.,
2018, Moorthy, 2012, Park et al., 1991, Völckner and Sattler, 2006). More subtly, fit influences
the feedback effects of brand extensions on the parent brand. As previously discussed, brand
extensions can produce reciprocal effects that enhance or diminish the equity of the parent brand:
A positively evaluated extension can both strengthen the parent brand and influence the sales of
established products, leading to an enhancement in brand equity. However, a failed extension can
foster negative evaluations that damage not only the extension’s market potential, but also the
parent brand’s established products, thereby leading to a dilution of brand equity (e.g., John et al.,
5Buratto and Zaccour (2009) focus on advertising strategies in a fashion licensing contract using a differential
game. Here, though, licensing is seen as a win-win strategy and no brand dilution can occur, as advertising only
generates positive externalities. Furthermore, the linear, ad valorem fee governing the contract is exogenous. Pnev-
matikos et al. (2018) assumed that a retailer’s investment in brand advertising can improve channel coordination
with the upstream producer.
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1998, Loken and John, 1993, Swaminathan et al., 2001). Indeed, previous research suggests that
similarity plays a moderating role in such reciprocal effects (e.g., Ahluwalia and Gürhan-Canli, 2000,
Boush and Loken, 1991, Czellar, 2003, Gürhan-Canli and Maheswaran, 1998, Keller and Aaker,
1992, Morrin, 1999). Granted, there have been mixed results for positive and negative reciprocal
effects: It seems that both brand dilution (i.e., negative reciprocal effects) and enhancement (i.e.,
positive reciprocal effects) occur when the similarity —between the parent brand and the extension
product—is high (e.g., Gürhan-Canli and Maheswaran, 1998, Keller and Aaker, 1992, Keller and
Sood, 2003, Pina et al., 2013, Swaminathan et al., 2001). In particular, increased similarity generally
leads to increased knowledge and affect transfer from the extension to the parent brand; as such,
consumers would likely view the extension’s success or failure as possibly reflecting on the parent
brand’s value. Likewise, consumers may feel that a dissimilar extension’s performance bears little
relation to the parent brand’s performance. In short, a dissimilar extension product provides little
benefit and causes little damage to brand value (Pina et al., 2013). Finally, recent research has also
advanced that the degree of similarity influences the organizational means deployed to create and
launch the new product in the market. This is the choice of make-versus-license: Managers tend to
internally develop the product categories that they perceive as similar to the parent category, even
when their level of control over the licensee is high, due to the higher potential for brand damage
(Colucci et al., 2008). Building on these contributions, this paper maintains that (dis)similarity
moderates the feedback effects and therefore acts as a driver in the make-versus-license choice.
The second factor is the presence of double-sided moral hazard in the licensing relationship.
Neither the brand owner nor the licensee can perfectly monitor the activity of the partner, which
generates the risk of opportunistic behavior (Jayachandran et al., 2013). If licensees behave op-
portunistically, they may manufacture a poor-quality product or use inappropriate distribution
channels, which would serve to devalue the brand. At the same time, the case of Calvin Klein
vs. Warnaco (Fournier and Boer, 2002) neatly illustrates that the licensor can also neglect the
licensee’s business (through, e.g., ineffective brand advertising) and thereby cause a decrease in
the licensee’s sales. In this regard, a number of scholars—such as Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine
(1995), Choi (2001) and Cachon and Lariviere (2005)—have addressed the presence of double-sided
opportunistic behavior, though in the domain of technological licensing or franchising. For instance,
Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) demonstrated that linear payments based on profit sharing
can be optimal in share contracts such as franchising and sharecropping. Choi (2001) looked at
the characteristics of the optimal licensing contract and related the size of the optimal royalty rate
to environmental parameters. Meanwhile, Cachon and Lariviere (2005) explored the pros and cons
of revenue-sharing contracts, focusing on their ability to coordinate the supply chain. However,
brand licensing contracts differ insofar as the brand owner/principal reaps profits from both the
parent brand and the extension product—profits that, as argued above, are intertwined with the
direct and reciprocal effects. As a consequence, an optimal contract needs to not only correct for
the misalignment of incentives between partners in the agency relationship, but also govern the
impact of the reciprocal effect on brand value.
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3 The model
3.1 Framework
In order to extend its brand to a new product, a brand owner can choose from two alternative
business models: in-house (or internal) development or brand licensing. The former requires the
(costly) acquisition of the resources and skills needed to develop and market the extension, but
allows the firm to retain complete control over the extension project. The latter involves contracting
with a separate firm and establishing a licensor-licensee relationship.
The brand owner reaps profits from both established assets (the “value” or “equity” of the
brand) and the new asset (the extension product). In order to preserve a focus on this essential
choice and its possible contractual terms, we will assume that the brand’s whole value is entirely
appropriated by the brand owner. With in-house development, the brand owner wholly reaps the
profits from the extension product. With licensing, by contrast, both parties share the profits from
the extension product according to the terms of their licensing contract. Brand value, as well as
the consumers’ willingness to pay for the extension product, depend on costly development and
promotion activities made by the firm(s). In particular, the brand owner makes costly investments
to create and maintain brand value, which positively affect the profits from both the brand and the
extension product. All else being equal, consumers’ willingness to pay for the extension increases
with their “general appreciation” for the brand, but the extension itself also requires specific in-
vestments in order to foster people’s willingness to pay for the product itself. In short, the effort
exerted on the extension product generates a reciprocal effect on the value of the brand. Following
the empirical literature, we assume that the magnitude of this effect depends on consumers’ per-
ceived dissimilarity between the extension product and the brand: All else being equal, a larger
dissimilarity dampens the reciprocal effect. In the case of in-house development, we posit that
this reciprocal effect is positive due to the brand owner’s knowledge of the brand’s characteristics.
In the case of licensing, however, we presume the reciprocal effect can be either positive (brand
enhancement) or negative (brand dilution). Under licensing, both the efforts of the brand owner
and of the licensee are not contractible, which results in a double-sided moral hazard problem. The
brand owner must therefore propose an incentivizing contract to the licensee.
It is worth remarking here that while the brand owner considers the (positive) effect of its
nurturing on the extension product (and the related positive reciprocal effect on brand value under
internal development), under brand licensing the licensee does not internalize the reciprocal effect of
its activities on the value of the brand. Therefore, in the case of brand licensing, the reciprocal effect
has the characteristics of an externality on brand value. Clearly, the licensing contract influences
the effort the licensee is willing to exert, which the brand owner can then leverage to indirectly
control this externality. Figure 1 depicts the relationships between brand owner and licensee in our
model. The red and blue boxes represent the assets that generate revenue for the brand owner and
licensee, respectively, while the signs on the dashed arrows represent the sign of the effort on the
specific asset.
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The trade-off between in-house development and brand licensing can thus be summarized as
follows: Under in-house development, the brand owner can perfectly monitor each production phase
(and therefore exert the efficient level of effort), but it needs to sustain high costs since the brand
extension’s market is more unproven than that of the core brand. Under brand licensing, the
brand owner can sidestep this (extra) cost by selecting an experienced licensee, but this requires
an incentivizing licensing contract that can generate inefficiencies and possibly expose the brand
to a negative reciprocal effect, thereby diluting its value.
To formally navigate this trade-off, and characterize the optimal licensing contract, we arrange
and solve a dynamic game involving the brand owner and a potential licensee.
3.2 Structure of the game
In the initial stage, the brand owner first decides whether to proceed with brand licensing or in-
house development. Under brand licensing, we assume that the brand owner has full bargaining
power in designing the contract and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the licensee. This is in line
with observed contracts, as the firm owns and controls the intellectual property. The timing of the
licensing sub-game is as follows:
1. The brand owner makes a take-it-or-leave-it contractual offer to the licensee.
2. The licensee accepts or rejects the offer. In case of rejection, the game ends. In case the
licensee accepts, the sub-game moves to stage 3.
3. The brand owner and the licensee simultaneously set effort levels.
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4. The licensee decides how much to produce in the extension product market.
5. Demand and profits are realized.
Under in-house development no actual (sub-)game is played, and the sequence of actions is the
following.
1. The brand owner decides how much effort to exert.
2. The brand owner decides how much to produce in the extension product market.
3. Demand and profits are realized.
We look for Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria of the preceding game. Figure 2 represents the timing
of the game.
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Figure 2: Timing of the game.
3.3 Fundamentals of the model
In order to focus solely on the choice between in-house and licensing, we assume that, in either
case, there is no market competition for the extension product (i.e., this market is monopolized).
Throughout the analysis, we will hypothesize that the costs of production, both for the brand owner
and the licensee, are nil.6
This will allow us to clearly pin down the features of the licensing contract and the trade-off
between brand licensing and in-house production. We model the demand of the extension product
as linear: P (q, θ) = θ− q, with θ = eb+ ej , with j ∈ {`, i}, where eb is the effort of the brand owner
in maintaining/improving the value of the brand, e` (res. ei) is the extension product demand-
enhancing effort exerted by the licensee (res. brand owner) in case of brand licensing (res. in-house
development). Last, q is the quantity of the extension product. Exerting effort is costly, and
6This is an innocuous assumption as long as the actual production costs of the brand owner and the licensee are
similar. In cases where they diverge by a relevant amount, a further force would be at work that reduces the interest
of the licensing agreement if the costs of the licensee exceed those of the brand owner or the interest of in house
development, in the opposite case.
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we posit that the associated cost function is convex, implying decreasing returns to scale both in
nurturing brand equity and in promoting the extension product. Here we also assume that, for the
same increase in the value of the extension product, the cost borne by the brand owner is always
larger than it is for the licensee. In formal terms we assume the following:
Assumption 1 (A.1). cb(eb) = e2b , c`(e`) = e2` and ci(ei) = βe2i , with β > 1.
The parameter β measures the inefficiency of the brand owner, relatively to the licensee, in
developing the extension: a higher β implies a larger cost, hence a larger inefficiency.
The value of the brand, denoted by R, is affected by the brand owner’s direct efforts in promoting
and maintaining it. However, given the above discussion, we also assume that the effort exerted in
fostering consumers’ willingness to pay for the extension product has a feedback effect on the value
of the parent brand. This effect becomes weaker the more that consumers perceive dissimilarity
between the extension and the products that characterize the brand (Keller and Aaker, 1992).7 Let
α ≥ 0 be the dissimilarity parameter (as α grows, the extension becomes more and more dissimilar
from the brand). Then, under in-house development, the brand value is:
Ri(eb, ei;α) = eb +
1
1 + αei.
We assume that, when the brand owner develops the extension internally, it always achieves a non-
negative feedback effect on brand equity through its effort to promote the extension product (i.e.,
there is always brand enhancement). The brand owner, though less efficient than the (potential)
licensee, is always able to identify and implement activities that yield a positive feedback effect, thus
boosting brand value. Still, the feedback effect weakens as the dissimilarity increases: Intuitively,
if consumers perceive the extension product as far removed from the brand, then they will be less
apt to transfer their perceptions from one to the other.
If the brand owner instead decides to extend the brand through licensing, it loses full control
over the extension process. As a result, the extension may produce either brand dilution or brand
enhancement. In either case, the magnitude of the effect still depends on the dissimilarity between
the brand and the extension product. We model this by considering the following functional form:
R`(eb, e`; γ, α) = eb +
γ
1 + αe`.
Under brand licensing, the licensee’s effort is filtered by the function γ1+α . As with in-house de-
velopment, the feedback effect becomes weaker as the extension product and brand become more
dissimilar. In addition, the effort of the licensee influences the value of the core product through the
parameter γ ∈ [−1, 1], which represents the magnitude and sign of the feedback effect. Contrary
7Under this assumption, if –say– Ferrari extends its brand to produce baseball caps with the Ferrari logo on
them, this product fully benefits from the reputation and prestige of Ferrari. Yet, whatever its sign, the reciprocal
effect on the value of the brand is “low” because of the large dissimilarity between caps and luxury sports cars. The
same full positive direct effect would be present if the extension involved small electric urban cars. However, in this
case, the feedback effect would be larger than that of caps because consumers would perceive this second extension
as closer to sports cars.
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to in-house development, the effort exerted by the licensee may have either a positive or negative
effect on the value of the core product. Specifically, there is brand dilution when γ < 0 and brand
enhancement when γ > 0. Both of these effects become weaker as the licensed product and the
brand become more dissimilar.8 With our framework established, we will analyze the two business
models—starting with licensing.
3.4 Brand licensing
3.4.1 Profits
During the first stage of the game, we assume that the brand owner licenses the brand to a licensee
and thus formally becomes a licensor. If the two firms cannot observe each other’s effort, then
they cannot implement first-best effort levels. As a consequence, the brand owner must propose an
incentivizing contract to the licensee. We assume the contract C offered by the brand owner takes
the form of a two-part tariff composed of a royalty rate per-unit, s, and a fixed fee, F such that
C = {s, F}.9
The licensee’s profits are given by:
pi`(q, eb, e`, C) = [P (q; eb, e`)− s]× q − F︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenues from ext. prod. sales
net of licensing fees
− e2`︸︷︷︸
Extension product
development cost
. (1)
The licensee reaps profits exclusively from selling the extension product and pays s on each unit
sold to the brand owner in addition to a fixed fee, F , as agreed upon in the licensing contract.
The brand owner’s profits are given by the following expression:
pib(eb, e`, C) = R`(eb, e`; γ, α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Brand value
+ s× q + F︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue from
licensing contract
− e2b︸︷︷︸
Brand value
nurturing cost
. (2)
The brand owner has two streams of profits: the returns from brand value and the payment for
licensing the extension product, which include both a share of quantity sold in that market, s× q,
and the fixed fee, F .
3.4.2 Equilibrium
Optimal quantity. Applying backward induction, we first determine the optimal quantity in the
extension product market as set by the licensee. Maximization of pi`(·) with respect to q returns:
q(eb, e`, s) =
1
2(eb + e` − s). (3)
8It should be said that full brand enhancement γ = 1 corresponds to the feedback effect level under in-house
development.
9This two-part tariff is standard in licensing contracts, as illustrated by Raugust (2012), and it has also been
shown that it is an optimal contractual schedule in models with double-sided moral hazard (Choi, 2001).
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As expected, the quantity sold by the licensee increases the effort exerted by both the licensee
itself (e`) and the brand owner (eb), and decreases the royalty rate, which acts as a variable
production cost.
By plugging that quantity back into the licensee’s profits, we obtain:
pi`(eb, e`, C) =
1
4(eb + e` − s)
2 − F − e2` . (4)
In a similar manner, by substituting the optimal quantity back into the brand owner’s profit, we
get:
pib(eb, e`, C) = eb +
γ
1 + αe` +
s
2(eb + e` − s) + F − e
2
b . (5)
Optimal effort levels. We now characterize the optimal effort levels of the brand owner and
licensee, which are defined as follows.10
eb(s) = arg max
eb
pib(eb, e`, C), e`(s) = arg max
e`
pi`(eb, e`, C). (6)
By simultaneously solving the two first-order conditions, we obtain:
eb(s) =
1
2 +
s
4 , e`(s) =
1
6 −
s
4 . (7)
It is easy to see that eb(s) is increasing in s, whereas the opposite holds for e`(s). This is intuitive:
All else being equal, an increase in the royalty rate increases (res. decreases) the profit of the brand
owner (licensee), and thus makes this agent more (less) willing to put effort into promoting the
brand (the extension product). In our analysis, θ and R are modelled such that the two effort levels
are additive; therefore the marginal effect is independent of each other’s effort levels. Lastly, and
for future reference, the linear-additive structure of θ implies that the total effort on the extension
product is independent on the royalty rate and equal to eb(s) + e`(s) = 23 .11
Substituting the optimal effort levels back into pi`(eb, e`, C) and pib(eb, e`, C), we get
pi`(C) =
1
48(2− 3s)
2 − F, pib(C) = 148
[
12 + 16s− 27s2 + 4 γ1 + α(2− 3s)
]
+ F. (8)
Optimal licensing contract. Because the brand owner is entitled to propose a take-it-or-leave-
it contract to the licensee, the licensee can only accept or reject the offer. Thus, the proposed
contractual terms will be such that the licensee is left indifferent between accepting or not, given
its outside option. To keep the analysis simple, we normalize this outside option to zero, which
implies that the licensee’s profits are also zero in the optimal contract.12 Consequently, in the
10It is a matter of simple calculations to ascertain that the profit functions are always concave with regard to each
firm’s own effort.
11Intuitively, this means that the brand owner, when setting the optimal royalty rate, fully internalizes its effect
on the licensee’s effort.
12Obviously, allowing for a positive outside option for the licensee would entail a reduction in the profitability of
the licensing contract for the brand owner, which would, in turn, make the licensing strategy less appealing, all else
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optimal contract, the brand owner appropriates all the licensee’s surplus—thereby, the fixed part
of the licensing tariff is F (s) = 148(2− 3s)2. The brand owner’s profit in this case would be:
pib(s, F (s)) =
1
24
[
8 + 2s− 9s2 + 2 γ1 + α(2− 3s)
]
. (9)
It is a matter of simple calculations to maximize the last expression with respect to s to find the
optimal royalty rate:13
s(α, γ) = 13
(1
3 −
γ
(1 + α)
)
≡ s∗. (10)
By plugging s∗ back into F (s), we obtain F (α, γ) = [5(1+α)+3γ]
2
432(1+α)2 ≡ F ∗. We can then state the
following:
Proposition 1. Under double-sided moral hazard, the optimal two-part licensing contract is
C∗ = {s∗, F ∗} =
{
1
3
(1
3 −
γ
(1 + α)
)
,
[5(1 + α) + 3γ]2
432(1 + α)2
}
. (11)
A first ancillary result is easily obtained.
Corollary 1. The optimal royalty rate s∗ is
(i) Decreasing in the reciprocal effect: ∂s∗∂γ < 0,
(ii) Negative for γ > 1+α3 and positive otherwise,
(iii) Decreasing in the dissimilarity α in the case of negative reciprocal effect (∂s∗∂α < 0 ∀γ ∈
[−1, 0)) and increasing in the dissimilarity in the case of positive reciprocal effect (∂s∗∂α >
0 ∀γ ∈ (0, 1]).
In order to understand the forces that shape the optimal royalty rate (and thus Corollary 1), it is
useful to keep in mind that the licensing contract is designed so that the brand owner appropriates
all the licensee’s generated surplus through the fixed fee, which leaves the royalty rate to be the
sole factor that shapes the effort and output incentives. This said, let us consider that, at F (s),
equation (2) can be re-written as:
pib(eb(s), e`(s), s, F (s)) = R`(eb(s), e`(s);α, γ) + P (q, eb(s), e`(s))× q(s)− eb(s)2 − e`(s)2. (12)
Taking the first order derivative with respect to s, we get (omitting the arguments for the sake of
readability)
∂pib
∂s
= ∂R`
∂eb
∂eb
∂s
+ ∂R`
∂e`
∂e`
∂s
+ q ×
(
∂P
∂eb
∂eb
∂s
+ ∂P
∂e`
∂e`
∂s
)
+ P × ∂q
∂s
− 2eb∂eb
∂s
− 2e`∂e`
∂s
. (13)
being equal.
13The profit function ΠB(s) is always convex in s because pi
′′
b (s, F (s)) = − 34 .
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Let ∂R`∂eb ≡ R′, then
∂R`
∂e`
≡ γ1+αR′, and ∂P∂eb = ∂P∂e` ≡ P ′. We get:
∂pib
∂s
=
(
∂eb
∂s
+ γ1 + α
∂e`
∂s
)
R′ + (q × P ′ − 2)
(
∂eb
∂s
+ ∂e`
∂s
)
+ P × ∂q
∂s
− 2eb∂eb
∂s
− 2e`∂e`
∂s
. (14)
Further, in our model R′ = P ′ = 1 and ∂eb∂s = −∂e`∂s ≡ e′ > 0, which, together with (7), imply that
(14) boils down to:
∂pib
∂s
= e′
(
1− γ1 + α
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Brand promotion effect
≥0
+ P × ∂q
∂s︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sales reduction effect
<0
+
[
−e′
(2
3 + s
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effort cost effect
<0
. (15)
The first term in (15) reflects a change in brand value stemming from an increase in the royalty
rate; we refer to this as the Brand Promotion Effect (BPE). As the royalty rate increases, the
brand owner is willing to put more effort into promoting the brand because, all else being equal, it
can obtain higher licensing profits. At the same time, the licensee is investing less to develop the
extension product, which has a feedback effect on the brand value (see (7)). However, the impact
of this effect depends on the sign and size of the reciprocal effect (γ), as well as the dissimilarity
between the brand and the extension product (α). In the case of brand enhancement (γ > 0), a
higher royalty rate hinders the licensee’s effort, thus reducing the positive spillover on brand value.
In the case of brand dilution (γ < 0), a higher royalty rate reduces the effort of the licensee, which
helps dampen the negative externality on the parent brand. In either case, the overall magnitude
of the effect is reduced (res. increased) as the dissimilarity between the extension and brand grows
larger (smaller). The assumptions on γ and α imply that γ1+α ∈ [−1, 1]: Therefore, the overall
effect of an increase of s on brand value is non-negative. In sum, the BPE pushes the licensor to
increase the royalty rate.
We label the second term in (15) Sales Reduction Effect (SRE). As indicated above, a higher
s fosters more effort from the brand owner while hindering the licensee. The two effects cancel
each other out in determining the maximum willingness to pay for the extension product: As
noted above, θ = eb(s) + e`(s) = 23 , so that a change in the royalty value has no effect on that
variable. Yet, a rise in the royalty rate does affect the extension product’s market, amounting to
an increase in the licensee’s marginal production cost. The obvious consequence is that increasing
the royalty rate reduces sales of the extension product, and thus the licensee’s profit. Eventually,
this translates into a lower fixed fee that can be contractually imposed by the brand owner. The
SRE clearly pushes the licensor to reduce the royalty rate.
We refer to the third term in (15) as the Effort Cost Effect (ECE). This force arises from an
increase in s, through its effect on the optimal effort levels, and affects the effort costs borne by
the firms. Now, recall that the licensee’s profit is completely appropriated by the licensor through
the fixed fee F (s), ultimately entailing that the brand owner – besides assessing how a variation in
s impacts its own cost – internalizes the effect of a variation of the royalty rate on the cost borne
by the licensee. In particular, a higher s spurs an increase in the brand owner’s effort and thus its
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cost, which then reduces its profit. This simultaneously lowers the licensee’s effort and cost, which
then increases its profit. The ECE is the result of these two forces and is negative, meaning that
an increase in s raises the cost of effort for the licensor more that it reduces that for the licensee,
which pushes the brand owner to reduce s.
Having disentangled the components of an increase in the royalty rate, let us now comment on
Corollary 1. Point (i), i.e., ∂s∗∂γ < 0, is explained by the fact that, as γ increases, the magnitude of
the BPE is reduced, while those of the SRE and ECE are unaffected. In other words, the forces that
drive down the royalty rate usurp the BPE. With a strong negative reciprocal effect (γ “close” to
−1) the licensee’s effort toward the extension product has a strong negative impact on brand value.
Consequently, the brand owner sets a high royalty rate, which has a dual impact: On one hand,
it limits the damage inflicted to brand value; on the other hand, it spurs the licensor’s own effort,
thereby countervailing the reduction in e` following the increase in s∗. This choice also increases
(decreases) the cost borne by the brand owner (licensee). As γ rises, the negative reciprocal effect
diminishes and eventually becomes positive. As a consequence, the brand owner has less need to
curb the licensee’s effort and can lower the optimal royalty rate, which also entails a reduction
in the overall costs generated by the two firms’ efforts. Interestingly, this effect, which pushes s∗
down, can be strong enough to make the optimal royalty rate negative, as remarked by point (ii)
of Corollary 1. This happens if γ > 1+α3 : the brand owner effectively subsidizes the licensee’s
efforts via a negative royalty rate in order to exploit a sufficiently large, positive reciprocal effect.
This boosts both the sales of the extension product—via a reduction in the licensee’s marginal
production cost—and the brand value. Clearly, the licensee’s costs increase, but this is more than
compensated by a reduction in the brand owner’s costs. It is worth highlighting that achieving a
subsidizing royalty rate requires that α < 2: The dissimilarity between the extension product and
the parent brand has to be “limited” (i.e., consumers must perceive the two as close enough) in order
to make the impact of the “large”, positive reciprocal effect strong enough to trigger a negative
royalty rate. Lastly, we consider point (iii) of Corollary 1. Dissimilarity has a negative effect on
s∗ under brand dilution and a positive one under brand enhancement. Under brand dilution, a
higher dissimilarity weakens the impact of the negative externality on brand value, thus reducing
the licensor’s incentive to restrain the licensee’s effort. By lowering the optimal royalty rate, the
brand owner facilitates an increase in sales of the extension product, which leads to an increase in
the licensing revenues, while also dampening the negative impact on brand value. Furthermore,
a reduction in the royalty reduces (increases) the brand owner’s (licensee’s) effort and therefore
its costs, resulting in a lower value for F (s). Under brand enhancement, the reasoning is the
opposite: A larger dissimilarity weakens the positive impact of the licensee’s effort on brand value.
By increasing s, the brand owner lowers the licensee’s effort (and thus cost), which amounts to a
larger F (s) and, simultaneously, an increase in its own effort, which has a direct impact on brand
value. We can now state:
Corollary 2. The optimal fixed fee F (s∗) is
(i) Increasing in the reciprocal effect γ: ∂F (s
∗)
∂γ > 0,
18
(ii) Increasing in the dissimilarity α in the case of negative reciprocal effect (∂F (s
∗)
∂α > 0 ∀γ ∈
[−1, 0)) and decreasing in the dissimilarity in the case of positive reciprocal effect (∂F (s∗)∂α <
0 ∀γ ∈ (0, 1]),
(iii) Always positive.
First of all, remember that the fixed fee equals the profit obtained by the licensee from the
sales of the extension product, gross of the fee itself. That said, the analysis of the behavior of
s∗ relative to γ and α helps to explain Corollary 2. As for point (i), letting γ increase from a
low starting value has the effect of lowering the optimal royalty rate; this ultimately increases the
sales of the extension product, the profit of the licensee and, eventually, the fixed fee demanded by
the licensor, which explains point (i) of the foregoing Corollary. Point (ii) is explained on similar
grounds: As a decrease in dissimilarity reduces the optimal royalty rate (like in the case of brand
dilution), a subsequent increase in α, through its royalty-reducing effect, induces an increase in
the licensee’s profit and thereby of the fixed fee, like in the case of an increase in γ. The mirror
reasoning explains the second part of point (ii): an increase in dissimilarity (as in the case of brand
enhancement) boosts the optimal royalty rate, which reduces the licensee’s sales and profits, and
thus the optimal fixed fee charged by the licensor. As a last remark, the optimal fixed fee is always
positive, unlike the optimal royalty rate. This is intuitive: In a two-part tariff contract, the fixed
fee is solely intended to extract the agent’s surplus, which relegates the incentivizing role to the
royalty rate.
Having characterized and discussed the optimal contract, we can now plug the values of C∗
back into the relevant variables of the model and obtain the following:
Corollary 3. At the optimal brand licensing contract C∗,
(i) The optimal efforts are
e∗b ≡ eb(s∗) =
19(1 + α)− 3γ
36(1 + α) , e
∗
` ≡ e`(s∗) =
5(1 + α) + 3γ
36(1 + α) , (16)
(ii) The quantity sold on the extension market is
q∗ = 5(1 + α) + 3γ18(1 + α) (17)
(iii) The profits of the firms are
pi∗b ≡ pib(C∗) =
30(1 + α)γ + 73(1 + α)2 + 9γ2
216(1 + α)2 , pi
∗
` ≡ pi`(c∗) = 0. (18)
Simple computation reveals that all the above variables are positive for all admissible parameter
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constellations. Furthermore, it is easily verified that:
∂e∗b
∂γ
= − 112(α+ 1) < 0,
∂e∗b
∂α
= γ12(α+ 1)2 R 0⇔ γ R 0, (19)
and
∂e∗`
∂γ
= 112(α+ 1) > 0,
∂e∗`
∂α
= − γ12(α+ 1)2 R 0⇔ γ Q 0. (20)
Also
∂pi∗b
∂γ
= 5(1 + α) + 3γ36(1 + α)2 > 0,
∂pi∗b
∂α
= −γ 5(1 + α) + 3γ36(1 + α)2 R 0⇔ γ Q 0. (21)
The effort of the brand owner (res. licensee) decreases (increases) with the reciprocal effect γ for
given α and increases (decreases) with the dissimilarity for given γ. In addition, the profit of the
brand owner, at the equilibrium of the licensing subgame, increases with γ for given dissimilarity
because, as pointed out above (see the discussion of Corollaries 1 and 2), a larger γ increases the
positive effect on brand value as well as the fixed fee F . A similar reasoning applies for an increase
in α in the case of brand dilution, which mirrors the case of an increase in dissimilarity in the
presence of brand enhancement. To complete our comments, we observe that, while the total effort
under brand licensing is constant e∗b + e∗` = 23 , α and γ dictate how the firms apportion this total
effort in the optimal contract.
3.4.3 Comparison with complete contract
It is instructive to compare the outcomes of the licensing game with those under complete contracts.
In this latter case, effort is contractible; consequently, the brand owner will propose a contract
that specifies the desired effort levels and extracts all the surplus of the relationship through a
fixed fee.14 Here we will limit ourselves to reporting the main differences relative to the incomplete
contract analyzed so far, the details of the calculations being relegated to Appendix A. As expected,
the optimal effort of the brand owner is always larger under a complete contract than under an
incomplete one, but this is not true for the licensee. In fact, the first-best effort of the licensee
falls short of the second-best one for γ < −1+α5 , which is a non-empty region under A.1 for α < 5.
The intuition is clear: When the reciprocal effect is negative enough and dissimilarity is small,
the brand owner contractually reduces the licensee’s effort in order to limit brand dilution. This
behavior can reach the point where the licensee is contractually bound to exert no effort at all.
This is particularly the case when γ < −1+α2 , which requires α < 2. In this parameter region,
the licensor’s effort is constant and equal to the aggregate one under incomplete contracts. It is
interesting to notice that, under incomplete contracts, the brand owner cannot contractually force
the licensee to refrain from developing the extension, and must therefore rely on the royalty rate
to curb effort provision. Under a complete contract, as long as the licensee is expected to exert
a positive effort, the aggregate effort is larger than that under an incomplete contract. The two
aggregate effort levels coincide when, in the optimal complete contract, the licensee is bound to
14See Choi (2001).
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exert no effort.
3.5 In-house development
Let us now analyze the case where the brand owner instead pursues in-house development. Here,
there is clearly no contract involved; rather, the brand owner selects the optimal effort levels needed
to achieve a desired sales quantity for the extension product. However, see Assumption A.1, the
brand owner is less efficient (by a parameter β > 1) than the (potential) licensee in carrying out
the development and promotion of the extension product. Granted, we also assume that the brand
owner’s efficiency in nurturing brand value does not vary relative to the brand licensing case.15
3.5.1 Profits
In case of internal development, the profit accruing to the brand owner is as follows:
pii(q, eb, ei) = Ri(eb, ei, α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Brand value
+P (q; eb, ei)× q︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from
extension product
− e2b︸︷︷︸
Brand value
nurturing cost
− βe2i︸︷︷︸
Extension product
development cost
. (22)
3.5.2 Equilibrium
We start by analyzing the brand owner’s sales behavior in the extension market, given the effort
levels of the previous stage.
Optimal quantity. Maximization of pii(·) with respect to q for given eb and ei returns (second-
order conditions are always satisfied):
q(eb, ei) =
eb + ei
2 , (23)
which can be plugged back into (22) to obtain
pii(eb, ei) = eb +
ei
1 + α +
(eb + ei)2
4 − e
2
b − βe2i . (24)
Optimal effort levels. Simultaneous maximization of pii(eb, ei) with respect to eb and ei yields
the optimal effort levels in brand value nurturing and extension product development under in
house development, which we summarize in the following.16
15In order to avoid burdening the notation, we will not introduce further indices to distinguish between the effort
of the brand owner in promoting the brand (eb) and the quantity of the extension product (q) under brand licensing
versus in-house development. We hope to mitigate any confusion by treating the two cases separately.
16The Hessian matrix of the maximization problem is H =
(
−3/2 1/2
1/2 1/2−2β
)
. Direct inspection reveals that the
first-order principal minors are negative and simple algebra confirms that detH = −1 + 3β is positive under A.1,
which insure the joint concavity of the maximand relative to the maximizers.
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Corollary 4. The optimal effort levels under in-house development are:
eˆb =
1
6
[ 4 + α
(1 + α)(3β − 1) + 4
]
, eˆi =
4 + α
2(1 + α)(3β − 1) . (25)
The optimal in-house effort levels are positive under assumption A.1; it is also straightforward
to obtain that
∂eˆb
∂β
= − 4 + α2(1 + α)(3β − 1)2 < 0,
∂eˆb
∂α
= − 12(1 + α)2(3β − 1) < 0, (26)
and
∂eˆi
∂β
≡ − 3(4 + α)2(1 + α)(3β − 1)2 < 0,
∂eˆi
∂α
≡ − 32(1 + α)2(3β − 1) < 0. (27)
These results are intuitive: On one hand, an increase in the cost of developing the extension
(all else being equal) negatively impacts the brand owner’s overall profits, thereby reducing its
general willingness to invest. On the other hand, a larger distance dampens the positive reciprocal
effect stemming from the extension on the product market, again reducing the firm’s profits and
willingness to invest. Thus, the total effort exerted under in-house development is eˆb + eˆi =
2(αβ+β+1)
(α+1)(3β−1) . Notably, this total effort is larger than the total under brand licensing, but this is
hardly surprising: The double-sided moral hazard problem arising from the latter situation reduces
both firms’ incentives to invest.
Substituting (25) back into (23) and (24) yields the following:
Corollary 5. Under in-house development of the extension product, at the optimal efforts eˆb and
eˆi,
(i) The quantity sold on the extension market is:
qˆ ≡ q(eˆb, eˆi) = 1 + β(1 + α)(1 + α)(3β − 1) , (28)
(ii) The profit of the brand owner is:
pˆii ≡ pii(eˆb, eˆi) = 112
[
(4 + α)2
(1 + α)2(3β − 1) + 4
]
. (29)
As before, computing first-order partial derivatives:
∂qˆ
∂β
= − α+ 4(1 + α)(3β − 1)2 < 0,
∂qˆ
∂α
= − 1(α+ 1)2(3β − 1) < 0, (30)
and
∂pˆii
∂β
= − (α+ 4)
2
4(1 + α)2(3β − 1)2 < 0,
∂pˆii
∂α
= − (α+ 4)(α+ 1)3(3β − 1) < 0, (31)
reveals that both the quantity of the extension product and the profit of the brand owner decrease
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in tandem with the firm’s cost-inefficiency and the dissimilarity between the extension product and
the parent brand. This aligns with our previous analysis: An increase in α or β reduces the brand
owner’s effort and ultimately results in lower profits.
3.6 Choice of the optimal business strategy
In the previous sections, we characterized and discussed the optimal licensing contract (and the
optimal efforts, sales and profit it induces), as well as highlighted the brand owner’s investment
and production choices when it opts for in-house development. We are now in a position to analyze
the brand owner’s optimal choice at the outset of the game—whether to make or license. For the
sake of readability, we will distinguish between a relatively cost-efficient brand owner (albeit still
less cost-efficient than a potential licensee, i.e., β > 1) and a relatively more cost-inefficient brand
owner, but discuss their outcomes organically. The proofs are relegated in Appendix B.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption A.1, a cost-efficient brand owner (1 < β < 193 )
(a) Develops in-house the extension for any dissimilarity level between the core product and the
extension market when γ < .2 or for β < γ(30+γ)−312γ2 if γ > .2.
(b) Develops the extension in-house for “small” dissimilarity, licenses it for “intermediate” dis-
similarity and reverts to in-house production for “large” dissimilarity when γ(30+γ)−312γ2 < β <
96
9γ2+30γ+1 +
1
3 .
(c) Licenses the extension for “small” dissimilarity and develops it in house for “large” dissimi-
larity when 969γ2+30γ+1 +
1
3 < β <
19
3 .
And
Proposition 3. Under Assumption A.1,a cost-inefficient brand owner (β > 193 )
(d) Develops the extension in-house for “small” dissimilarity and licenses it for “large” dissimi-
larity when β < 969γ2+30γ+1 +
1
3 .
(e) Licenses the extension for any dissimilarity when β > 193 and β >
96
9γ2+30γ+1 +
1
3 .
Figure 3 depicts the parameter space partition determined by the foregoing Propositions, as
well as reports the reciprocal effect (in the case of brand licensing), γ, on the horizontal axis and
the cost-inefficiency of the brand owner (in the case of in-house development), β, on the vertical
axis. Though apparently complex, the qualitative message conveyed follows a recognizable pattern:
In-house development is the dominant choice when the brand owner is efficient and the reciprocal
effect is either negative or only slightly positive. Similarly, brand licensing is dominant when the
brand owner is inefficient and the reciprocal effect is moderately to strongly positive. In the other
cases, the optimal choice depends, in a possibly non-linear way, on the degree of dissimilarity
between the extension and the brand. That said, we will now detail the intuition underlying the
choice of the optimal business model, starting with Proposition 2.
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Case (a) is easily understood. Here the brand owner is relatively cost-efficient (1 < β < 193 )
and therefore has a “small” incentive to enter a licensing relationship because the (limited) gains
arising from the development costs are more than offset by the inefficiency of the incentivizing
contract. In addition, in the case of brand dilution, a licensing contract would adversely impact
brand value and thereby reduce the profitability of this business model. Hence, the choice toward
in-house development. A similar reasoning applies even in the case of brand enhancement: As
long as γ is small enough, a small positive reciprocal effect only partially compensates for the
contractually-driven inefficiencies.
Before delving into case (b), it is useful to comment on case (c). In this region, the brand owner
is still relatively cost-efficient, but the reciprocal effect is positive and strong. As a consequence,
the brand owner licenses the brand when the dissimilarity is small, thereby boosting the large
positive impact on brand value at the cost of entering an inefficient contract. An increase in
dissimilarity dampens the positive spillover from the extension onto the brand and increases the
relative profitability of in-house development. Thus, that choice is dominant for a “large enough”
dissimilarity.
Keeping these ideas in mind, let us now move to region (b). The parameter conditions in
this region are intermediate relative to cases (a) and (c): For any given cost inefficiency, β, the
brand enhancement is larger than in (a) but lesser than in (c); for any given level of reciprocal
effect, γ, the cost inefficiency is larger than in (a) but smaller than in (c). Clearly, the first and
second effects push the brand owner toward licensing or in-house production, respectively. When
the dissimilarity is small, the brand owner prefers to exploit its (relatively small) cost efficiency to
avoid entering the contract, thus opting for in-house development. As the dissimilarity increases,
the brand owner reduces its effort on the extension market (see equation (27)), as would do the
licensee in the same situation (see equation (20)). Yet, it is easy to see that the brand owner’s effort
on the extension market decreases faster than that of the licensee for γ > 0 and β < 193 because of
the former’s relatively higher cost-inefficiency. As α increases and triggers the shift, the licensing
option becomes more profitable than in-house development. Nonetheless, a further increase in α
hinders the positive effect of licensing (as happens in region (c)), which makes in-house development
preferable again for a “large” dissimilarity.
Let us now turn to Proposition 3. Case (d) is the mirror image of case (c): Here, the brand owner
is relatively inefficient in developing the extension, but still prefers this business model when the
dissimilarity is small and reciprocal effect is either negative or only slightly positive. Because brand
licensing reduces brand value and generates the cost of an inefficient contract, it should be avoided
when a small dissimilarity exposes the brand value to a relevant harm (or a tiny enhancement),
even at the (large) cost of developing the extension in-house. An increase in the dissimilarity,
however, shields the core brand from said harm and thus allows the brand owner to safely license
the extension and exploit the licensee’s relative cost efficiency. Finally, in case (e), the optimal
business model is brand licensing for any dissimilarity level. The intuition is straightforward: Here
the reciprocal effect is positive and the brand owner is inefficient, so that the cost of entering an
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inefficient contract is always less than that of developing the extension in-house.
1
−1 1 γ
β
IH → BL(αր) BL
IH (a)
BL→ IH(αր)
IH → BL→ IH(αր)
19
3 (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure 3: Optimal business model in the (γ, β) space.
4 Discussion and conclusions
Despite the pervasiveness of brand licensing across industries, there is a need to understand the
conditions under which brand owners should opt for this business model to extend their brands
and, relatedly, what characterizes an optimal licensing contract. In this paper, we offer a com-
prehensive dynamic model that analyzes both needs. In doing so, we have built on insights from
research on brand extension and brand licensing, as well as on technological licensing. Our model
was particularly informed by studies on the degree of dissimilarity between the brand and the ex-
tension product; the occurrence of reciprocal effects; the possibility that both parties can behave
opportunistically, and the assumption of the brand owner/licensor’s relative cost inefficiency.
Our analysis provides two sets of results. The first set of results hinges on our choice of consid-
ering a two-part tariff, which provides a fine grained picture of the structure of the optimal licensing
contract (Raugust, 2012). While the fixed fee extracts all the licensee profit (net of investments in
the extension category), the royalty rate is the variable part of the tariff that shapes the licensee’s
incentives. Previous research on brand licensing had yet to delineate the effects of appropriating
the surplus (for the licensor) from the structuring of incentives (for the licensee) (Jayachandran
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et al., 2013). Likewise, the related literature on franchising has only explored the relationship
between fixed fee and royalty rate (Kaufmann and Dant, 2001). By contrast, our model considers
these two components of the tariff in terms of the degree of dissimilarity between the brand and
the extension product, as well as the magnitude of the reciprocal effects. Our results suggest that,
for a given level of dissimilarity, the royalty rate is always larger in the presence of brand dilution
than in the presence of brand enhancement. Consistently, brand owners should apply a higher
fixed fee in the presence of brand enhancement than in the presence of brand dilution, for a given
level of dissimilarity. A noticeable consequence of these results is that the incentives should be
designed to protect the value of the extension product, as the sum of the investments in the value
of the extension (by the licensor and the licensee) is constant. This result is novel because previous
research has highlighted the role of concerns about protecting soloìely the brand when setting the
contractual terms (Jayachandran et al., 2013).
In our case, we also remarkably found that under brand dilution, the licensor increases the
royalty rate—and thus reduces the effort of the licensee while increasing its own—in order to
sustain brand value.
In line with extant research, our study confirms that opportunism influences royalty rates be-
cause venture partners cannot observe each other’s effort levels (Jayachandran et al., 2013, Robinson
et al., 2015). More interestingly, we suggest that royalty rates are set not only with the desire to
partially correct the effects of the information asymmetry, but also to control for the reciprocal
effects, which in our model are influenced by the degree of dissimilarity. Along this line, our anal-
ysis corroborates brand extension studies (Czellar, 2003) that uncovered the moderating role of
(dis)similarity on reciprocal effects in the context of brand licensing.
The second set of results pertains to the choice of make-or-license, which is based on the working
assumption that the licensee is always more cost-efficient in developing the extension product than
the brand owner/licensor. Figure 3 depicts five possible occurrences that depend on the levels of the
reciprocal effect and the brand owner’s (relative) degree of cost inefficiency. Region (a) represents
the case in which the licensor is only slightly less efficient than the licensee. Here, the former
opts for in-house development regardless of the level of dissimilarity. Indeed, the brand owner has
no reason to enter into an inefficient relationship (i.e., characterized by opportunistic behavior),
especially when the extension product would harm brand value. Companies are especially likely to
manage products in-house when they characterize a brand portfolio, so as to avoid the opportunism
that accompanies an agency relationship. Instances of this include the eyewear division of Kering
Group (see footnote 4), the accessories (bags, small leather goods) of Valentino, or the jewelry
and watches division of Gucci. Usually, these in-house extensions are pursued via acquisition when
dissimilarity is high, or via internal development when dissimilarity is low.
The region (d) identifies the situation in which the licensor is very inefficient, so the business
model changes from in-house to licensing as dissimilarity increases. When dissimilarity is high,
we identify this region as brand stretching, or merchandising: The brand owner exploits its brand
strength to offer collateral products, such as consumer-oriented items and gadgets (e.g., Ferrari
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caps, Disney bathrobes). In this case, licensing is the preferred means for the brand owner/licensor
to exploit the licensee’s efficiency, and given that the spillover effect is negative, the damage to the
brand is low.
The region (e) mirrors (a) and represents the situation where a very inefficient brand owner
always opts for brand licensing, for any level of dissimilarity, in order to exploit the licensee’s
capabilities and take advantage of brand enhancement. This result is anecdotally supported by
the brand extensions that, even if far from the core product, characterize the brand as a “lifestyle
brand” (i.e., create an area of taste and style consistent with the brand). An instance of this is
the brand Armani: Beyond its haute couture line Armani Privé and the fast fashion brand Armani
Exchange, the firm offers everything that one needs for a luxury lifestyle—from sweets and flowers
to restaurants and hotels.
Finally, there are two areas that provide insightful, albeit less intuitive outcomes than those
above. Region (c) posits the following question for the brand owner: “Why engage in a licensing
agreement when the extension product is going to enhance my brand value, and I am not that
inefficient?” The answer is that when the dissimilarity is low, the brand owner can still exploit
the licensee’s higher capacity and obtain a positive return on the brand value. As dissimilarity
increases, the positive feedback diminishes; thus, the brand owner would be better off leveraging
its own relative “efficiency” and avoiding a contract that could be undermined by opportunism.
Although a potential artefact of our study, region (b) delivers some interesting findings. Here
the (relatively efficient) brand owner opts for in-house development at both the low and high
dissimilarity levels, while pursuing licensing when dissimilarity is “intermediate”. For low dissimi-
larity values, the brand owner benefits from brand enhancement without any contract inefficiency;
for high dissimilarity values, the brand owner does not pursue the contract because the level of
brand enhancement is hindered by the high dissimilarity. For intermediate values of dissimilarity,
the brand owner accepts the inefficiency of the contract in order to exploit the licensee’s greater
productive efficiency and thereby obtain brand enhancement. While we cannot immediately sub-
stantiate this outcome with anecdotal evidence, we believe this region represents an interesting
non-linear effect of dissimilarity on the make-or-license choice. Future research might give it more
empirical attention.
4.1 Implications
The managerial and economic literatures have devoted scant attention to the context of brand
licensing. Our analysis attempts to fill this gap by providing a comprehensive model that offers
the simultaneous analysis of the optimal contract and the decision of whether to engage in such an
agreement.
As for the literature on brand extensions, our study contributes to research on “the other side”
of brand leveraging (Lane and Jacobson, 1997, p. 261), that is, the reciprocal effect exerted by the
extension product on the brand value. Since the 1980s, extant research has largely explored the
choice of whether or not to extend a brand, as well as the drivers of brand extension evaluations;
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however, there has been less attention on the strategic role of reciprocal effects, and specifically the
implications of such feedback effects (e.g., Hariharan et al., 2014, Lane and Jacobson, 1997). By
moving away from technological licensing and franchising, our model better addresses the nuances
of brand licensing—by positing the existence of a feedback effect from the new product to the
parent brand. Colucci et al. (2008) advanced that the risk of negative effect seems to outweigh
the advantages of licensing, thereby affecting managers’ choices; however, they only considered the
adverse effect, which they proxied in their model with the degree of similarity. Our analysis goes a
step further by explicitly encompassing both the positive and negative feedback effects, highlighting
that reciprocal effects shape both the optimal licensing contract and the choice of make-or-license.
Our study also supports the role of dissimilarity as a moderator of the reciprocal effects (as suggested
in the context of brand extension). Robinson et al. (2015) showed that a higher “fit” (i.e., similarity)
between the brand and the licensed product leads investors to better evaluate the brand, which
would then increase the brand owner’s royalty rates. Our study extends the knowledge about “fit”
between parent brand and extension product, demonstrating that (dis)similarity affects both the
level of royalty rates and fixed fee—and ultimately, the choice of make-or-license. Beyond possibly
increasing the brand owner’s cash flow, the relevance of the brand extension also drives the choice
to license the brand and shapes the payment structure with the partner.
Finally, by adopting a framework in which the opportunism is two-sided, we provide a more
suitable picture of the information asymmetries in a specific B2B relationship. By contrast, previous
research has only considered the case of licensee opportunism (Colucci et al., 2008, Robinson et al.,
2015). To this end, we drew on insights from the technological licensing and franchising literatures
(Lafontaine et al., 1992) to better translate the two-sided opportunism case to brand licensing. We
confirm that an incentivizing licensing contract can (partially) align both parties’ goals. Yet, our
analysis specifically uncovered that the contractual structure can be used to (partially) countervail
the negative effect on the parent brand (in the case of brand dilution) and to better exploit the
positive effect (in the case of brand enhancement).
To conclude, our study highlights a rich set of testable implications that could be an object of
further empirical research.
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Appendices
A First-best licensing contract
If a complete contract can exist, it specifies the effort levels that maximize the joint profit of the
firms, with the royalty rate set to zero, in order not to distort the output choice on the extension
market. The complete contract also specifies a fixed fee that transfers to the brand owner all the
surplus from the licensing relationship.
For sFB = 0, the quantity that maximizes the profit from the sales of the extension product is
qFB = eb+e`2 . At this quantity, the net joint profit of the firms is
piFB(eb, e`) =
1
4
[
2eb(2 + e`) +
4γ
1 + αe` − 3e
2
b − 3e2`
]
, (32)
which is also the profit accruing to the brand owner. By maximizing piFB with respect to the effort
levels we get:
eFBb =
3 + 3α+ γ
4 + 4α , e
FB
` =
1 + α+ 3γ
4 + 4α . (33)
It is easy to ascertain that, while eFBb is always positive, eFB` is so only for γ > −1+α3 . As a
consequence, the effort levels in (33) are meaningful in this parameter constellation only. It is
immediate to observe that, in this region, eFBb > e∗b : the effort of the brand owner is always larger
under complete contracts. Yet, this is not the case for the licensee, indeed eFB` R e∗` ⇔ γ R −1+α6 .
We can derive the brand owner profit, which are
piFB(eFBb , eFB` ) =
1
8
[
γ(2α+ 3γ + 2)
(α+ 1)2 + 3
]
. (34)
A simple comparison shows that piFB(eFBb , eFB` ) > pi∗b .
When γ ≤ −1+α3 , the first-best contractual effort of the licensee is non-positive. Accordingly,
the values in (33) are no longer meaningful because the brand owner only exerts effort. To find the
value of eb in this case we consider piFB(·) evaluated at e` = 0:
piFB(eb, 0) =
1
4
(
4eb − 3e2b
)
, (35)
which is maximized for eb = 23 . At this effort level piFB(
2
3 , 0) =
1
3 . It is a simple matter of algebra
to prove that, in this case as well, the profit under the first best contract exceeds that of the second
best one.
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B Proof of Proposition 2 and 3
The profit of the brand owner at the equilibrium of the licensing subgame is:
pi∗b =
30(1 + α)γ + 73(1 + α)2 + 9γ2
216(1 + α)2 , (36)
and that at the equilibrium of the in-house development:
pˆii =
1
12
[
(4 + α)2
(α+ 1)2(3β − 1) + 4
]
. (37)
Taking the difference between the two functions and rearranging terms we obtain
∆pi(α;β, γ) ≡ pi∗b − pˆii =
α2(3β − 19) + α[30(3β − 1)γ + 6β − 146] + 9(3β − 1)γ2 + 30(3β − 1)γ + 3β − 289
216(α+ 1)2(3β − 1) . (38)
It is clear by inspection that the denominator of ∆pi(·) is positive and continuous under Assumption
A.1, thus the relative profitability of brand licensing versus in-house development depends upon
the sign of the numerator only. Let N(α;β, γ) denote the numerator of (38), which we are going
to analyze as a (quadratic) function of α. In particular, by combining the information about the
concavity and number of roots of the numerator, we will be able to derive the conditions under which
brand licensing is preferred to in-house development or the opposite, and whether the dissimilarity
parameter α plays a role in this choice. It will be useful to define the following:
N0 ≡ N(0;β, γ) = (9γ2 + 30γ)(3β − 1) + 3β − 289, (39)
αc ≡
{
α : ∂N(·)
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=αc
= 0
}
= −3β(15γ − 1) + 15γ + 7319− 3β , (40)
and
Nc ≡ N(αc;β, γ) = 54(3β − 1) {γ[(12β − 1)γ − 30] + 3}19− 3β . (41)
N0 is the value of N(·) for α = 0, αc is the value of α for which the first-order partial derivative of
N(·) is zero and Nc is the value of the function N(·), computed at αc.
Before proceeding further, it is instructive to identify the following loci:
N0 = 0 ⇔ β = 969γ2 + 30γ + 1 +
1
3 , (42)
αc = 0 ⇔ β = 2415γ + 1 +
1
3 , (43)
Nc = 0 ⇔ β = γ(γ + 30)− 312γ2 , (44)
which are depicted in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: The loci N0 = 0, αc = 0, Nc = 0.
This said, as a first observation notice that the second-order partial derivative of N(·), ∂2N(·)
∂α2 =
6β − 38 R 0⇔ β R 193 , which implies that N(·) is a concave parabola for β > 193 and a convex one
for β < 193 .17 We will treat the cases separately. It will prove useful to keep in mind that the sign
of the denominators of (40) and (41) changes in the regions 1 < β < 193 and
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3 < β.
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2 (1 < β < 193 )
N(·) is a concave parabola, therefore we know that:
(i) αc is the value of α for which N(·) is at its maximum,
(ii) Nc is the value of N(·) at the maximum,
(iii) limα→∞N(·) = −∞.
Point (iii) allows us to conclude that for α “large enough” N(·) is negative and thus the optimal
business model is In-House development (IH hereafter). Therefore, the issue is to know whether for
“small enough” α Brand Licensing (BL hereafter) can be the optimal choice instead. We start by
analyzing the case where there is no other optimal choice than IH and move to the case of possible
different optimal choices afterwards.
B.1.1 IH optimal choice for all α
Two possible configurations result in IH as the dominant choice for the brand owner, for any value
of α: (1) Nc ≤ 0 and (2) Nc > 0 ∩ αc < 0 ∩N0 < 0.
17The case β = 198 , where N(·) is a straight line is briefly discussed at the end of this proof.
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Case (1). The condition is:
Nc < 0⇔ β < γ(30 + γ)− 312γ2 , (45)
which can be fulfilled because, the locus Nc = 0 has a maximum value of 193 for γ = .2 (see fig. 4),
which is the maximum value β can take too.
Case (2). The set of conditions here is:
αc < 0 ⇔ β < 2415γ+1 + 13 ,
Nc > 0 ⇔ β > γ(30+γ)−312γ2 ,
N0 < 0 ⇔ β < 969γ2+30γ+1 + 13 .
(46)
By virtue of the discussion above, the first condition is more stringent than the third one, and
it is easy to prove that 2415γ+1 +
1
3 is actually larger than
19
3 for all the values of γ such that
γ(30+γ)−3
12γ2 < β <
24
15γ+1 +
1
3 . Furthermore,
γ(30+γ)−3
12γ2 =
24
15γ+1 +
1
3 =
19
3 for γ = .2 (see Figure 4).
We summarize the above discussion in the following:
Lemma 1. Under Assumption A.1 and 1 < β < 193 , IH is the only optimal business model when:
(i) −1 < γ < .2 and β > γ(30+γ)−312γ2 ,
(ii) .2 < γ < 1 and β < γ(30+γ)−312γ2 .
B.1.2 BL optimal choice for “small” α, IH optimal choice for “large” α.
For BL to be the optimal choice when α is small, N(·) has to be one and only one positive root.
This happens when N(·) is positive for α = 0, requiring:
N0 > 0⇔ β > 969γ2 + 30γ + 1 +
1
3 , (47)
and yields:
Lemma 2. Under Assumption A.1 and 1 < β < 193 , when β >
96
9γ2+30γ+1 +
1
3 a threshold value for
α exists, α˜ > 0 such that for 0 < α < α˜ the optimal business model is BL, for α˜ < α the optimal
business model is IH.
B.1.3 IH for “small” and “large” α, BL for “intermediate” α.
A last possible occurrence has to be tackled, namely a possible non-linear behavior of the optimal
business model relative to α, which can emerge when N(·) has two positive and distinct roots. This
32
requires that αc > 0 ∩Nc > 0 ∩N0 < 0, that is to say:
αc > 0 ⇔ β > 2415γ+1 + 13 ,
Nc > 0 ⇔ β > γ(30+γ)−312γ2 ,
N0 < 0 ⇔ β < 969γ2+30γ+1 + 13 .
(48)
From the above analysis, we know that, as long as 1 < β < 193 the second condition is more stringent
than the first, which leads us to state
Lemma 3. Under Assumption A.1 and 1 < β < 193 , when
γ(30+γ)−3
12γ2 < β <
96
9γ2+30γ+1 +
1
3 two
threshold values for α exist, αˇ and αˆ, with 0 < αˇ < αˆ such that for 0 < α < αˇ the optimal business
model is IH, for αˇ < α < αˆ the optimal business model is BL and for αˆ < α the optimal business
model is IH.
Proposition 2 directly follows from Lemmata 1 to 3.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3 (β > 193 )
N(·) is a convex parabola, therefore we know that:
(i) αc is the value of α for which N(·) is at its minimum,
(ii) Nc is the value of N(·) at the minimum,
(iii) limα→∞N(·) =∞.
Point (iii) allows us to conclude that for α “large enough” N(·) is positive and thus the optimal
business model is BL. Mirroring the proof of Proposition 2, the question is to know whether for
“small enough” α IH can be the optimal choice instead. We start by analyzing the case where
there is no other optimal choice than BL and move to the case of possible different optimal choices
afterwards.
B.2.1 BL optimal choice for all α
There is no other optimal choice than BL for β > 193 in two possible cases: (1) Nc ≥ 0 (2)
Nc < 0 ∩ αc < 0 ∩N0 > 0.18
Case (1). The condition is:
Nc ≥ 0⇔ β ≤ γ(30 + γ)− 312γ2 . (49)
Under Assumption A.1 and β > 193 this can never be true because the maximum value that the term
on the right-hand side of the second inequality can assume is 193 (for γ = .2). Since by assumption
β is larger than that value, we conclude with the following:
Remark 1. Under A.1 and β > 193 , Nc < 0.
18In the following, the expression –say– Nc > 0 stands for “{β, γ} : Nc > 0 is true”.
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Case (2). Remark 1 allows to simplify the conditions stated above, which reduce to:
αc < 0 ⇔ β >
24
15γ+1 +
1
3 ,
N0 > 0 ⇔ β > 969γ2+30γ+1 + 13 .
(50)
It is a matter of simple calculations to show that, for β > 193 the second conditions is more stringent
than the first, which allows us to state the following:
Lemma 4. Under Assumption A.1 and β > 193 , when β >
96
9γ2+30γ+1 +
1
3 BL is the only optimal
choice for the brand owner.
B.2.2 IH optimal for “small” α, BL optimal for “large” α
Let us consider now the situation where IH is the optimal choice for suitable “small” values of α.
This means that, in that parameter range, N(·) is negative and then, as remarked above becomes
positive, which amounts to saying that N(·) has one and only one positive root. The conditions
insuring this are Nc < 0 and N0 > 0. However, Remark 1 insures that the first condition is satisfied
for β > 193 therefore the unique condition to be checked in this case is:
N0 < 0⇔ β > 969γ2 + 30γ + 1 +
1
3 . (51)
We conclude that, in this case a critical value of α exists, α¯ such that N(·) is negative for α lesser
than that threshold and positive for α larger than the threshold. We summarize the economic
intuition in:
Lemma 5. Under Assumption A.1 and β > 193 , when β >
96
9γ2+30γ+1 +
1
3 a threshold value for α
exists, α¯ such that for 0 < α < α¯ the optimal business model is IH, for α¯ < α the optimal business
model is BL.
A third case has to be considered, namely that where the optimal business model is non-linear
in α because N(·) has two positive roots, implying that, starting from a low value of α the optimal
choice is BL, then it becomes IH and finally is gets back to BL. This requires that:
αc > 0 ⇔ β > 2415γ+1 + 13 ,
Nc < 0,
N0 > 0 ⇔ β > 969γ2+30γ+1 + 13 .
(52)
However, it is clear by the discussion of (50) that the first and third conditions of (52) are not
consistent with each other, thereby allowing us to discard the possibility of a non-linear behavior of
the choice of the optimal business model relative to α when β > 193 . Proposition 3 Directly follows
from Lemmata 4 and 5.
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For the sake of completeness we briefly hint at the cutting-edge case β = 193 . In this case N(·)
is linear and in α:
N(α; 193 , γ) = 54α(10γ − 2) + 54
(
3γ2 + 10γ − 5
)
. (53)
Furthermore, this function is increasing in α for γ < 15 and decreasing otherwise and has a zero
for α = 3γ2+10γ−52(1−5γ) . In intuitive terms, BL is the optimal business model only in the case of a
“non-small” positive reciprocal effect, whereas IH is preferred when the reciprocal effect is positive,
but small, and negative.
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